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Summary  findings
There is a close, if imperfect, relationship between the  the general effect is to cause agents to make longer-terni
effectiveness of an economy's capital markets and its  - hence, more transaction-intensive - investments. The
level (or rate of growth) of real development. This may  result is a higher rate of return on savings and a change
be because financial markets provide liquidity, promote  in its composition.
the sharing of information, or permit agents to specialize.  These general equilibrium effects on the composition
There is literature about how these functions help  of savings cause agents to hold more of their wealth in
increase real activity, but surprisingly little literature  the form of existing equity claims and to invest less in the
predicting how the volume of activity in financial  initiation of new capital investments. As a result, a
markets relates to the level or efficiency of an economy's  reduction in transaction costs can cause the capital stock
productive activity.  either to rise or fall (under scenarios described in the
Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr address this question:  paper).
How does the efficiency of an economy's equity market  Further, a reduction in transaction costs will tvpically
- as measured by transaction costs - affect its  alter the composition of savings and investment, and an'
efficiency in producing physical capital and, through  this  analysis of the consequences of such changes must take
channel, final goods and services?  those effects into account.
The answer: As the efficiency of an economy's capital
markets increases (that is, as the transaction costs fall),
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It is now beyond  dispute  that there is a close  - if albeit  imperfect  - relationship  between
the effectiveness  of an economy's  capital  markets  and its level (or rate of growth) of real
development.' This may  be because  financial  markets  provide  liquidity  [Bencivenga  and Smith
(1991), Levine  (1991)], promote  the acquisition  and dissemination  of information  [Diamond
(1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986),  Williamson  (1986), Greenwood  and Jovanovic  (1990)], or
permit agents  to increase  specialization  [Cooley  and Smith  (1992)]. And  yet, while  there exists
literature  pursuing  how each  of these functions  contributes  to increasing  real activity,  surprisingly
little  of that literature  provides  predictions  about how  the volume  of activity  in financial  markets  is
related  to the level  or efficiency  of an economy's  productive  activity. Indeed,  there is surprisingly
little  existing  investigation  of the following  question: how are an economy's efficiency  in
performing  financial  transactions  and its efficiency  in performing  physical  production  related? It is
our purpose  to pursue  the answer  to that question  in some  detail. In the process,  we will also be
able  to discuss  how  an economy's  volume  of financial  transactions  and its level of real activity  are
related.
In addition,  we would  like  to be able  to say something  about  why the connections  between
the development  of an economy's  financial  markets  and its level of real development  - while
close  - are not perfect. Many prominent  growth successes  - for example  Korea and Taiwan  -
have  experienced  their success  despite  heavily  regulated  financial  systems. And, all too often,
attempts  by govermments  to stimulate  the development  of financial  markets in LDC's have  been
(apparently)  counterproductive. 2 Why should  this be the case  if financial  market development  is,
typically,  conducive  to real development?  This is an issue we also wish  to investigate.
1In attempting  to answer  the questions  we  have  posed,  we  will  draw  on two fairly
fundamental  insights.  One  is  that  the most  productive  capital  investments  will  often  require  that
large  amounts  of funds  be committed  for  substantial  periods,  with  investors  facing  relatively  long
times  to payout  [Bohm-Bawerk  (1891)].  The other  is  that investors  are unlikely  to commit  funds
to such  investments  in the absence  of well-functioning  capital  markets  that can  provide  them  with
liquidity.  The  second  point  was,  of course,  made  quite  forcefully  by Hicks  (1969)  in the context
of the question,  what  made  the industrial  revolution  revolutionary?  Hicks  argued  that  the
industrial  revolution  was  not  the consequence  (or,  at least,  the immediate  consequence)  of a set of
new  technological  innovations,  as most  of the innovations  that were  exploited  in the early  phases
of the industrial  revolution  had occurred  some  time  earlier.  Rather,  according  to Hicks,  what  was
new  was  that the implementation  of these  particular  innovations  on an economical  scale  required
that investments  of large  magnitude  be made  in highly  illiquid  and  activity  specific  capital  for long
periods.  This  would  not have  been  possible  in the absence  of  financial  markets  to provide
liquidity.  Thus  technological  innovation  by itself  was insufficient  to stimulate  growth;  another
precondition  for  the implementation  of new  technologies  was  the existence  of liquid  capital
markets.  The industrial  revolution  therefore  had  to wait  for the financial  revolution 3 before  it
could  occur: according  to Hicks
What happened  in the Industrial  Revolution  ... is that the range  of fixed
capital  goods that were used in production  ... began noticeably  to increase...
But fixed  capital  is  sunk;  it is embodied  in a particular  form,  from  which  it
it can only  gradualy ... be released. In order that people should  be willing  ...
to sink large  amounts  of capital,  ... it is  the availability  of liquid  funds  which
is  crucial.  This  condition  was satisfied  in  England  ... by the first  half  of the
eighteenth  century ... The liquid  asset was there, as it would not have  been
even  a few  years  earlier. [Hicks  (1969),  pp. 143-145].
2We view Hicks as asserting  that individual  investors  face two important  timing  decisions
with respect  to their capital  investments:  the time  to payout  (or maturity)  of the investment,  and
its holding  period. With poorly  developed  equity  markets  the transfer  of capital  ownership  is
inhibited,  and an individual  investor  will  face a time to payout  and a holding  period that are
identical. As Hicks argued,  this will prevent  an array of investments  from being  undertaken.
However,  once equity  markets  allow  the ownership  of capital  to be transferred  economically,
individuals  can separate  decisions  involving  the maturity  of an investment  from  the length  of time
they will  hold it themselves.  Hence  such markets  permit  investors  to choose a maturity  of
investment  that maximizes  yield,  while  also choosing  a holding  period to satisfy  the desired  timing
of their own transactions.  The maturity  of an investment  is no longer held  hostage  to the desired
liquidation  dates of wealth-holders.
This set of observations,  of course, implies  that the costs of transacting  in equity  markets
are of great importance for affecting not just the level  of investment, but its composition.  Which
kinds of investments  appear  economical  will  depend  not  just on their productivities,  but on the
cost of transferring  ownership  of them, if necessary. Thus the efficiency  of an economy's  financial
system  (measured  by the costs of transacting  in equity  markets)  has implications  for which
investments  are undertaken. And  which  investments  are undertaken,  in equilibrium,  is an issue
that affects  the composition  of savings. The relationship  between  the costs of transacting  in
capital  markets,  the choice  of investment,  and the composition  of wealth-holding  between existing
equity  claims  and the initiation  of new capital  investment  is one that has far-reaching  implications.
These implications  permit  us to make some  observations  about why the association  between
financial  market  development  and real development  is not a perfect one.
3In order to discuss  the relationship  between  capital  market efficiency  (transactions  costs),
productive  efficiency,  and the composition  of savings,  we employ  essentially  the simplest  model
we can imagine.' Savings,  investment,  and consumption  decisions  are undertaken  in an
overlapping  generations  model  with two period lived  agents. In order to trivialize  savings,  labor
supply,  and production  decisions,  both preferences  and the technology  for producing  final  goods
are assumed  to be linear. The innovations  of the analysis  - which  we highlight  by heavily
simplifying  all other aspects  of the model  - are that there exist several  technologies  for converting
current  output into future capital,  and that ownership  of capital  is costly  to transfer. The first
feature allows  us to address  the issue  of the equilibrium  choice  of investment  technology
emphasized  by Bohm-Bawerk  and Hicks,  the second  allows  us to index  the effectiveness  of an
economy's  capital  markets  by the costs of transacting  in them.
More specifically,  then, we assume  that there are J > I technologies  available  for
converting  current output into future capital. These  technologies  are indexed  by  j = I ,...,  J, and
technologies  differ  as folows.  One unit of current output invested  in technology  j yields  Rj units
of capital  - gross of transactions  costs  - after  j periods. Thus investment  technologies  vary by
maturity  () and productivity  (PO).
Since  agents are two period lived,  the use of technologies  with  j > I requires  the
ownership  of immature  capital  to be transferred  in capital  resale  - or equity  - markets. For
simplicity  we assume  a proportional  transactions  cost structure in these markets. Agents, then,
will decide  which  investment  technologies  to use based  on their yields,  net of transactions  costs.
Since  transactions  costs have  a greater effect  on the net of transactions  cost yields  of longer
maturity  investments  (these investments  are resold  more times,  and hence are more  "transactions
4intensive"),  high  transactions  costs imply  that the equilibrium  maturity  of investments  will  be
relatively  short (in order  to economize  on capital  resale). As argued  by Bohm-Bawerk  and Hicks,
this is likely  to imply  that the investments  made are relatively  unproductive.
We then investigate  the consequences  of (exogenous)  reductions  in transactions  costs for
steady state equilibria.  For the reasons  we have  described,  transactions  cost reductions  tend to
favor  the use of longer  maturity  investments,  and hence are conducive  to observing  certain  kinds
of increases  in productive  efficiency.  Reductions  in transactions  costs also necessarily  raise  the
net of transactions  costs rates of return on (all)  investments,  and they therefore  raise  the
equilibrium  rate of return on savings. However,  transactions  cost reductions  have potentially
complicated  consequences  for capital  accumulation  and steady state output.
Why should  this be the case? If transactions  costs represent  real resource  costs, their
reduction  has two effects. First, such a reduction  raises  the - net of transactions  cost -
productivity  of all investment  technologies.  If the composition  of wealth-holding  remained
constant,  this effect  would  necessarily  increase  capital  formation  and steady state output.
However, the composition  of saving  - much  less the equilibrium  choice  of investment  technology
- wiil not typically  remain  constant  with an increase  in the efficiency  of equity  markets. Such
changes  make  the ownership  of already  existing  equity  more attractive,  ceteris  paribus,  and they
can cause some  fraction  of agents' wealth  to be transferred  away  from the initiation  of new capital
investment,  and into the ownership  of existing  equity. This effect  is detrimental  to capital
formation  and production. Moreover,  as it turns out, either  effect  can dominate. We describe
when each situation  does dominate,  and hence  when increasing  the efficiency  of equity  markets  is
and is not conducive  to capital  accumulation.  Thus we can not only describe  why  equity  market
Sconditions  are important  determinants  of both productive  efficiency  and real activity,  but also why
the relationship  between  equity  market  conditions  and real development  is an imperfect  one.  In
particular,  in analyzing  the effects  of an improvement  in the functioning  of equity  markets,  it is
necessary  to be fully  cognizant  of how this will affect  the composition  of wealth-holding.
We are also able  to examine  how the level  of transactions  costs impacts  on the volume  of
financial  market  activity,  and on steady state welfare. We consider  two polar cases:
(i) transactions  costs represent  real resource  costs, and (ii) transactions  costs are pure transfers
(such as fees or rents to brokers  or market  makers,  or possibly  taxes paid  to the government).
The latter possibility  allows  us to analyze  the consequences  of attempts to subsidize  or tax various
financial  market activities  by varying  these fees.
In either  case,  a reduction  in transactions  costs increases  the volume  of equity  market
activity. However,  since  a transactions  cost reduction  may  or may  not lead to increased  output
levels,  an increase  in the volume  of financial  market  activity  can, but need not be, associated  with
an increase  in the level of real activity. Also,  when transactions  costs represent  genuine  resource
losses,  their reduction  leads to higher  steady state welfare.!
The latter conclusion  must be substantially  modified,  however,  if transactions  costs simply
represent  transfers. Here transaction  cost reductions  may either  raise or lower steady state
welfare. In particular,  it is possible  that an economy  can undertake  a socially  excessive  volume  of
financial  market transactions. In this case, it will be desirable  to raise the fees associated  with
equity  market  activity. This situation  is particularly  likely  to occur in economies  that (with  zero
fees) have  low real interest rates  but large tmnsactions  volumes.
6The remainder  of the paper proceeds  as follows. Section  I lays out the model  economy
we employ,  while  Section  II describes  the nature  of trade and transactions  costs, and sets out the
conditions  of a (steady  state) competitive  equilibrium.  Section  m examines  how the level of
transactions  costs affects  the choice  of investment  technology,  the rate of return on savings,
capital  accumulation  and output,  steady state welfare,  and the volume  of equity  market activity
when transactions  costs represent  true resource  costs. Section  IV reconsiders  these issues when
transactions  costs represent  pure transfers. Section  V concludes,  and comments  on some issues
that can be addressed  in more complicated  versions  of this framework.
7L  The Model
A. The Environment
In this section  we describe  what we believe  is the simplest  model  that can be used to
illustrate  the issues  we have  just discussed. This model  confronts  both households  and producers
with what are essentially  trivial  decisions. In doing  so, we are able to focus on what seems  to us
the most central  issue;  how transactions  costs in equity  markets  affect  the composition  of savings
and investment, and - through those channels  - capital accumulation.
To that end, we consider  a two-period-lived,  overlapping  generations  model  with
production.  Time is indexed by t = 1,2, ..., and in each period a new young generation is born
with N identical  members.6  Each agent is endowed  with one unit of labor when young,  which  is
supplied  indlastically,  and all agents are retired when old. No agents other than the initial  old are
endowed  with capital  or consumption  goods at any date.
In each period  there is a single  consumption  good produced,  which  can either  be eaten or
converted  into capital. We assume  that all agents care only  about old period consumption,  which
we denote simply  by  C.7  Thus each agent will save his entire  young period income  at each date.
The consumption  good is produced  according  to a constant returns to scale  - in fact a
linear  - technology  using capital  and labor as inputs. Thus a firm  employing  K, units of capital
and L 1 units of labor at t can produce
F(Y-4,14)  = AK&  + b14
units of the final  good."
Capital  is also produced  from the final  good using a set of linear  capital  investment
technologies. We assume  that there are J such technologies,  indexed  by j = 1,...,  J. These
8technologies  differ  along  two dimensions;  productivity  and gestation period (or time to maturity).
In particular,  one unit of the final  good invested  in technology  j at t yields  R?  > 0 units of capital
(gross of transactions  costs) at t + j.  Thus  j represents  the gestation  length  of capital  investments
in technology  j, while  RN  represents  the (gross) productivity  of that technology.
We assume  further  that if K, denotes  the total capital  stock available  at t, K, is simply  the
sum of maturing  capital  investments  produced  through  all technologies. Thus, more specifically,
all capital  - produced  by any investment  technology  - is perfectly  substitutable  as an input  in final
goods production. 9'0
Since  agents are two period  lived,  the use of any investment  technology  with  j > I requires
owners  of "capital  in process" (henceforth  CIP)  to transfer  ownership  of it in equity  markets.
This is true of CIP in all periods  prior to maturity,  so that ownership  of CEP  is transferred  through
a sequence  of holders  in equity  - or capital  resale  - markets. Our interest is in considering  how
the costs of transacting  in these markets  affects  capital  accumulation  and per capita income,  the
equilibrium  return on savings,  the equilibrium  choice  of capital  production  technologies,  and
welfare  in a steady state equilibrium.
For simplicity  we assume  a proportional  transactions  costs structure  confronting  agents
who operate in equity  markets. Our specific  assumption  is that transferring  ownership  of one unit
oftechnology  j CIP, that has been in process  for h periods (is  j-h periods  from maturity),
consumes  ci'o  units of CIP. Thus, after a sale of one unit of type (.,h) CIP, I - o 9 units remain."'
Finally,  we assume  that when CIP matures  it is used in the production  process, and then
depreciates  completely.  This assumption  allows  us to abstract  from the existence  of resale
markets for mature - as opposed to maturing - capital.
9B.  Trade
Three kinds of transactions  occur in this economy: capital  and labor are rented in
competitive  factor markets,  final  output is bought and sold, and agents trade ownership  of CIP in
competitive  equity  markets. In order to focus on transactions  costs in equity  markets,  and to
otherwise  keep  the model  as close  to standard  as possible,  12  we assume  that there are no costs
associated  with transactions  in output or factor markets. We also focus throughout on steady
state equilibria. We therefore  omit  time subscripts  wherever  possible.
Let w denote  the (steady  state value of) the real  wage rate, and let r denote  the rental  rate
on capital. Equality  between  the appropriate  factor prices  and their corresponding  marginal
products  requires  that
(I)  r=a
(2)  w=b
Each young agent earns  the wage  income  w, all of which  is saved. Let S denote savings
by a representative  young  agent,  measured  in units of CIP. The only  decision  confronting  such an
agent is how to allocate  his savings  among  various  alternative  assets; the available  assets are type  j
CIP  I  -1,... 1)  of vintage  h (h - 1,...,  j - 1). Mature capital  is simply  rented  to firms.' 3
Let S'j denote  the amount of type  j CIP that is h periods  old acquired  by a representative
agent. Then, for example,  SO  represents  the amount  of newly  initiated  investment  in technology  j,
while Sj"l is the amount of typej CIP  acquired  that will mature  in one period. Similarly,  let PAb
be the price  - in units of current  consumption  - of one unit of technology  j CIP that is h periods
old. Since one unit of the final  good invested  in technology  j at any date becomes  one unit of
10technology  j CIP (by choice  of units),  Pi.° = 1. Moreover,  mature CIP is simply  capital,  which is
rented  to firms. As one unit of technology  j CIP yields  Rj units of rentable  capital  on maturity,
= rRj  must hold.  14  For j > 1  and 0 < h <j, Pih must be determined.
Without  loss of generality,  we can assume  that transactions  costs are born by sellers  of
CIP. Then, since  each  agent consumes  only  when old, the budget constraints  confronting  an
individual  agent are
(3)  Pil  PiSO  < w
J-1  b-0
(4)  c <  I  p'￿'  Sih (1  cci+).
,-1  b=O
We also impose  that SiJ 20, V(j,h).
It is easy  to see that agents  will purchase  type  (j,h) CIP only if type (j,h) CIP bears as high
a rate of return (net of transactions  costs) as any  other available  investment  opportunity. Then if
SiA  > 0 holds for any agent,
(5)  (1-a  +)  Pi"/P  > (I1a  ) P -+/P"
must hold for all 1, and for all m s I - 1.
If SJj > 0 for some  pair (,h), for some  agent in a steady state equilibrium,  then SA  > 0
must hold for all h = 0, ..., j - 1, and for some agent in that same equilibrium. This obviously
requires  that the return to holding  technology  j CIP is the same  for all possible  times  to maturity,
that is
(6)  (14-tol) Pi.+l,)Pi  = (I-ce) 0'01-
is satisfied  for all h = 0,...,  j - 1. Similarly,  if technologies  j and n are in use at all dates, then
11(7)  (14"')  P+'/P'  = (1-a"')  P  AR 1pA
must hold, for all m = 0,..., n - 1. Of course,  if technology  j is employed  in a steady state
equilibrium,  equation  (5) may  hold as a strict inequality  for some e  j.  In this case technology  I
is not in use in the equilibrium  in question.
All capital  investment  technologies  that are utilized  in equilibrium,  then, bear a common
(gross) rate of return, net of transactions  costs. We denote  this return by y. Then, if technology  j
is active  in a steady  state equilibrium,
(8)  r= (l..~.1+1)  PI+,/Pill
for all h = 0,...,j-  1.
When  rates of return on all capital  investments  in use are equated,  clearly  each young
agent is indifferent  regarding  the composition  of his portfolio. The aggregate  composition  of
investment  will,  nevertheless,  be determinate,  as we will see shortly.
I  Steady State Equlibrium
In order to describe  the steady  state equilibrium  capital  stock, output level,  and rate of
return on savings,  it is necessary  to know two things. First, we need  to know which  capital
production  technology  (or technologies)  will  be in use in such an equilibrium  and, in addition,  we
must know how savings  will be divided  among  CIP of different  times to maturity  in this
technology.  We now turn our attention  to these issues.
12A. The Equilibrium Choice of Investment Technology
Recall  that Pi-'  = 1  and Pij = rRN  hold,  for all  j.  We now note that, again for all  j,
(9)  f=  (PI+I/0h).
b-a
If technology  j is in use in a steady state equilibrium  then equation  (8) holds as well. Substituting
(8) into (9) yields
(10)  rRj(TY/fI  (1cI+),
where (yY is simply  y raised  to the  jth power. We now define  RK  to be the productivity  of
technology  j, net of transactions  costs. Then
huO
Equations  (10) and (11) imply  that, if technology  j is in use,
(12)  y = (rRj  Pi,
or in other words, that the rate of return on savings  is simply  the intenal rate of return on any
capital  production  technology  employed  in equilibrium.
If technology  j is active  in equilibrium,  it is also the case  that (5) holds,  V I *  j, V m
0,..., I - 1. Equations  (5), (8), and (9) then imply  that
(13)  (rR,) " s y
is satisfied  for all I *j.  Thus the capital  production  technologies  employed  in equiibrium are
those that maximize  the internal  rate of return on capital  investments,  net of trnsactions costs.
Let j  denote an equilibrium  choice  of capital  production  technology. Then
13(14)  =  argmax  [(aRj)lr].
For the present  we assume  that j  is unique,  which  will  generically  be the case.  "  It follows  that
the equilibrium  rate of return on savings  is
(15)  (a
To summarize,  in choosing  which  technology  to utilize,  agents care only about the internal
rate of return on investments,  net of transactions  costs. The costs of transacting  in equity  markets
influence  the equilibrium  capital  production  technology  through  their influence  on this rate of
return. After characterizing  the remaining  aspects  of an equilibrium,  we will pursue  the
implications  of this observation.
B.  The Capital Stock, and the Composition of Savings
Let e  denote the fraction  of per capita savings  invested  in the ownership  of technology  j
CIP of vintage  h.  "1 Then for  j - j*, for all h = O, ...,j - 1,  0  =O.  For h = O,...,  j  -1,  we now
describe  the determination  of &  ^.
Since  the values  CA are (aggregate)  portfolio  weights,  clearly
(16)  z  b  0 j.h 1
.- 1  b-O  bo-
must hold. In addition,  the market  for type (*,h) CIP must clear  at each date: The demand  for
such CIP is, of course, given  by O'^ w/pIO. 17 The supply  of type (j*,h) CIP is the amount of new
capital  investments  in technologyj  initiated  h periods  ago, less the amount of CIP consumed  by
the transactions  technology  in the interim. Thus the supply  of type 0*,h) CIP equals
14h-l  h-l
V,O1w  11 (I  -& ')P''0 ='  00  =  171  (w  1O  '),
1=0  1=0
b-l
since  I - fj  (1-c/"+,) of the initial  CIP created  has been lost in the transactions  process. The
1=0
market  for type (j*,h)  CIP clears,  then, if
(17)  Owh  W  =  Cw  n  (I-a  O-)W
1=0
We now observe  that
(18)  psh = Pi,O (  >.b-1)(pJ.WZ(pi.h2)  .. 1p**,/pj* 0)  =  (Y)h/  (1-a,+1).
1=0
Substituting  (18) into (17), we obtain
(19)  @*wh  =  (Y)h 0,.0.
Equations  (16) and (19) then  imply  that
.(20)  E  Ph=0-  ,b  ,.o  y= Oj*.O  (I  (yy*]/(1-Y)=1>
b=0  h=o
or equivalently,  that
(21)  0  ° = (1 - y)/[1  - (y ]-
In view of equation  (15), equations  (21) and (19) assert  that the composition  of savings  is
determined  entirely  by the internal  rate of return on investments  in the equilibrium  capital
production  technology. In particular,  equation  (21) describes  how  this rate of return deterrnines
the amount  of new capital  investment,  while  (19) then  governs  how the remainder  of agents'
savings  are allocated  to the purchase  of already  existing  CIP in equity  markets.
lsThe intemal  rate of return on savings,  of course, depends  on two factors: the marginal
product  of capital  (a), and the net of transactions  cost productivity  of the equilibrium  investment
technology  (Ri.).  We now investigate  how changes  in Rp. influence  capital  accumulation.
Let k denote  the per capita  capital  stock in a steady state equilibrium  Then
(22)  k = Rio E)j 0w.
Equation  (22) simply  notes  that the steady  state equilibrium  capital  stock (per capita), equals the
per capita initiation  of new capital  investments  j* periods  early  (G'° 0w), times the amount of
capital  produced,  per unit invested,  net of transactions  costs (R1.).  Using equations  (2) and (21)
in (22) gives  us the altemative  equilibrium  condition
(23)  k = (bij.)  (1 - y)/[1 - (yY ] = (b/a) (aRp.) (1 - y)/[l - (yy]  =
(b/a) (yf  (1  - 'y)/[I - (yY*].
If we now define  the functions  Hj(x);  j = 1,...,  J, by
(24)  Hj(x) a x*(I  - x)/(l - xj),
then we can rewrite (23) more compactly  as
(s25)  k = (b/a) Hj. (y).
Equation  (25) indicates  that the per capita capital  stock is determined  entirely  by the
relative  productivity  of labor and capital  (b/a), and by the internal  rate of return on capital
investments,  net of transactions  costs. Since  per capita output is simply  b + ak, once k has been
determined,  so has the steady state level  of per capita income.
16C.  Equity Market Activity
The real value of equity market transactions in each period -- in per capita terms - is
simply  per capita  saving,  less  the real value  of new capital  investments  initiated. In particular,  all
savings - other than what goes into new capital investments -- is used to purchase existing CIP in
equity  markets. Thus the real  value of purchases  in equity  markets  is
w(l  - @  °) = b {  I - [(I - y)/[l - (yf*]]) = b {[y  -(yy*]/[1 - (yY  ]),
where  the second  equality  follows  from (2) and (21). If we consider  equity  market  activity  as a
fraction  of total saving,  this in turn is given  by [y - (yyo]/[1  - (y) ]. If we define  the finctions Gj;
j=  I,...,J,by
(26)  Gj(x) _ (x - x')/(1 -
then Gj.(y)  gives  the fraction  of savings  that is used to purchase  existing  CIP in equity  markets.
D. Some Results
We now  wish  to examine  how all aspects  of a steady state equilibrium  - the equilibrium
choice  of capital  investment  technology,  the rate of return on savings,  the per capita  capital  stock,
and the volume  of activity  in equity  markets  - depend  on the underlying  parameters  of the
economy  and, in particular,  on the costs of transacting  in equity  markets. This issue is the topic of
Section  III but, in order to pursue  it, it will be useful  to collect  some  properties  of the functions  H 1
and Gj. These properties  are stated in the following  two lemmas  (which  are proved in the
appendix).
Lemma 1.  The functions  Hj(x)  satisfy  the following  conditions,  V  j = 1,...,  J.
(a)  Hj(x)  2 O,  V x 2 0
17(b)  Jim Hj(x)  =  O
(c)  lim Hj(x)  = ao
(d)  Hj(l) = l  )V
(e)  H;(x)>0,  Vx>0.
(f)  ~~Hj+l(x)  s Hj(x)  holds,  V x 2 0.
Lemma 2.  The functions  Gj(x)  satisfy  the following  conditions,  v j =1,.,  J.
(a)  O  <Gj(x)  l, V x 2 0.
(b)  Gj+l(x)  >Gj(x), V xt0.
(c)  GI;(x)  >0,  V x >0.
IIL  The Effects of Changes in Transactions Costs
A.  A Representation of Transactions Costs
We now investigate  how changes  in the level of transactions  costs affect  all aspects  of a
steady state equilibrium.  In order  to do so, it will  be convenient  to be able  to represent
transactions  costs as depending  on a single  scalar parameter,  which  we denote  by z.  Our specific
technical  assumption  is that
(27)  R  , (z);j  J
Thus, in other words, the net of transactions  cost productivity  of each capital  investment
technology  is a function of the transactions  cost parameter  z.  We assume  that RU(z) 2  0, for all
j, so that increases  in z represent  reductions  in transactions  costs.
181.  An Example
Suppose  that oi ° = oii = 0, and that aih = aE(0, 1) for all h  0j.  (This is simply  the case
of constant  proportional  transactions  costs.) Then R_  Ra (1  -ay.  If we let z -- I - a,  then
R, (z) 5  RjZ,
2.  The Structure  of Transactions  Costs
In order  to obtain  definitive  results  on the consequences  of a change  in z, it will  be
necessary  to place  some  structure  on the functions  R, (z). We now make  the following
assumptions.  (i) Since  there are no transactions  costs associated  with one period investments,
RI  = RI.  Therefore
(28)  R, (z) - 0.
(ii) Since  long-maturity  projects  are resold  more times  than short-maturity  projects (that is, they
are more "transactions  intensive"),  we assume  that a reduction  in transactions  costs has a larger
proportional  effect  - averaged  over the life of an asset  - on longer  than on shorter-gestation
investments.  "  Our specific  technical  assumption  is that
(29)  R;(z) /3  R j (z) > it, (z) It it  (z)
whenever  j > t.  It is easy  to verify  that (29) implies  that a reduction  in transactions  costs has a
larger proportional  effect  on the internal  rate of return on long than on short-gestation  capital
investments.  It is also easy  to verify  that (28) and (29) are satisfied  by some obvious  transactions
cost structures;  for instance  they are satisfied  by our previous  example.
19B.  The Dependence of Equilibrium Values on Transactions Costs
It will now  prove useful  to have  a notation  for the dependence  of various equilibrium
outcomes  on z. The equilibrium  rate of return on savings,  of course, is simply
(30)  y(z) =  max  [  a  (z),(2(z))12  ,...,
In addition,  suppose  we define  j(z) by
(31)  j(z) E  argmax{[R (z)]"j},
so that  j(z) is simply  the choice  of capital  production  technology  that maximizes  the internal  rate
of return on investments,  given  the transactions  cost parameter  z.  Then, defining  the function
H(z) by' 9
(32)  H(z) =-  Hj*.)[y(z)]
the steady state equilibrium  capital stock (per capita) -- k(z) -- is given by [see equation (25)]
(33)  k(z) = (b/a) H(z),
ifj(z) is unique. Similarly,  if we let
(34)  G(z) _ Gj(*[y(z)],
then the fraction  of total savings  consumed  by purchases  of existing  CIP is nothing  more than
G(z) [again,  ifj(z) is unique]. Thus G(z) gives  the fraction  of wealth  held in the form of equity
for each value of z.
It is now straightforward  to show  how the capital  stock and the value of equity  market
transactions  depend  on z.  To do so, it will  be useful  to have the following  preliminary  result.
Proposition 1.  (a) z' > z implies  that  j(z') 2 j(z).  (b) z' > z implies  that y(z') 2 y(z), and the
inequality  is strict ifj(z') > 1.
20The proof of proposition 1 appears  in the appendix. The proposition  asserts that the equilibrium
maturity  length  of capital  investments  rises  as transactions  costs decline,  as does the rate of return
on savings. The first  result reflects  the fact that - under  the assumption  of equation  (29) -
transactions  cost reductions  have  a larger proportional  impact  on the net of transactions  cost rates
of return for longer than  for shorter maturity  investments.  As a consequence,  one effect  of a
decline  in transactions  costs is to increase  the relative  attractiveness  of longer gestation
investment  technologies.  The second  result  follows  from the observation  that transactions  cost
reductions  raise  the internal  rate of return on all investment  technologies  (with  j > 1), and hence
necessarily  increase  the rate of return on savings  ifj(z) > 1.
Figure 1 plots k(z) as a "function"  of z.  Proposition  I establishes  that  j(z) is non-
decreasing  in z. Thus, ifj(z) = I holds  for any values  of z, it necessarily  holds only for "small"
values. As long as  j(z) = 1  does hold,  k(z) = (b/a)  HI(aR,), since aR, is the internal  rate of return
on technology  1. Thus,  for "small  z", the per capita capital  stock is independent  of z.
As z continues  to increase,  at some  point  technology  1 ceases to maximize  the internal
rate of return on savings,  as lower transactions  costs increase  the return on longer-maturity  capital
investments. If technology  t maximizes  the internal  rate of return on investment  for moderate
values of z, then k(z) = (b/a) Hj{[aR(z)]"')  gives  the equilibrium  level  of the per capita capital
stock. By similar  reasoning,  continued  increases  in z can eventually  cause some  even longer-
maturity  capital  investments  to be brought  into use, so that technology  n, n > e,  maximizes
internal rates of return on investment. Here k(z) = (b/a) H. ([aR  (z)]tIA). Of course, oncej(z)  =
J, no further  increases  in the maturity  of capital  investments  are possible,  and k(z)  =
(bla)Hu  ([aR (z)]"').
21The solid locus  in figure 1  represents  (b/a)H(z). When  j(z) is unique,  H(z) is simply  a
function  given  by equation  (32). However,  there will  be a finite  set of values  of z where  j(z) is not
unique,  and where  two or more  capital  production  technologies  yield  the same intemal  rate of
retum. For example,  technologies  e and n > e  yield  the same internal  rate of return iff
[aR,  (z)]"' = [aR.  (z)]"".
The assumption  of equation  (29) implies  that this condition  can hold at at most one value of z.
When it does hold, investors  are indifferent  between  employing  either technology.
If technologies  t and n both maximize  the internal  rate of return on capital  investments,
investors  might utilize  technology  I exclusively,  or they  might utilize  technology  n exclusively,  or
they might  utilize  convex  combinations  of the two technologies. The exclusive  use of technology
t results in a (steady  state) per capita capital  stock of(b/a)H 1{aR  (z)]"') = (b/a)Ht{[aR. (z)]'").
The  exclusive  use of technology  n results  in a (steady  state) per capita capital  stock of
(b/a)H.{[aR 3 (z)]")}. Convex  combinations  ofthe two technologies  result in (steady  state) per
capita capital  stocks which  are convex  combinations  of these values. 20
Lemma 1 establishes  that, if n > e, Hn{[aRn  (z)]l}) < Ht{[aRn  (z)]"')  holds. As a result,
the steady  state  per  capita capital  stock must be a non-monotonic  function  of z.  In particular,
proposition 1 establishes  that if z' > z holds,  then  y(z') > y(z), so long as j(z') > 1. Since
H;  (y) > 0 V  j, ifj(z') = j(z) > 1, a reduction  in transactions  costs must result in increased  (long-
run) capital  accumulation. However,  ifj(z') > j(z), and if z' and z are sufficiently  close, Hj(Z)[y(z)]
> Hj[y(z')]  must hold. Thus small  increases  in transactions  costs that increase  the equilibrium
choice of investment  maturity  are actually  detrimental  to capital  formation.
22Why does this occur? The answer  has to do with the level of activity  in equity  markets,
which  is depicted  in figure  2. For "small"  z, j(z) = 1 holds,  and so does G(z) = Gl[y(z)]  = 0 [see
equation  (26) with  j = 1]. This  simply  reflects  the fact that the use of one period  gestation
production  technologies  necessitates  no capital  resale,  and hence involves  no financial
transactions.  However,  as z increases  so does  j(z), and when  j(z) > I holds,  so does G(z) > 0.
Moreover,  since Gj (y) > 0 holds  for all  j, as does Gj+.(y)  > Gj(y),  G(z) is unambiguously
increasing  in z.  Thus a reduction  in transactions  costs necessarily  increases  the fraction  of wealth
held  in the form of equity  (ownership  of CIP). 2'
This observation  implies  that a reduction  in transactions  costs has two consequences  that
work in opposite  directions  from the standpoint  of capital  formation. First, a reduction  in
transactions  costs increases  Rj (z) for all  j > 1, and this effect  acts to increase  the capital  stock,
ceteris  paribus. However,  reductions  in transactions  costs also increase  the fraction  of savings
held  in the form of equity. As a result, less  new capital  investment  is initiated  - a consequence
that acts to reduce  the capital  stock. Ifj(z') = j(z), the former  effect  necessarily  dominates.
However,  ifj(z') > j(z) holds,  and if z' - z is sufficiently  small,  the second effect  necessarily
dominates. It follows  that an increase  in the efficiency  of equity  markets  need  not imply  capital
deepening.
Notice  that this last observation  depends  on two factors. One is that the choice  of capital
production  technology  in use depends  on the level of transactions  costs, and that there is such a
choice  to be made. The other is that the choice  of capital  production  technology  affects  the
composition  of savings  between  equity-holdings,  and the initiation  of new capital  investment. It is
these channels  by which  transactions  cost reductions  can be detrimental  to capital  accumulation.
23Analyses  of the role of transactions  costs that ignore  these compositional  effects,  then, can easily
give  highly  misleading  answers  about the consequences  of the increased  efficiency  of equity
markets.
To summarize  the results  of this section,  then, a reduction  in transactions  costs
(a) increases  the rate of return on savings  (and does so strictly  ifij  > 1), (b) increases  the fraction
of savings  held  in the form of equity,  and (c) may  either increase  or reduce the steady state per
capita capital  stock.
1. Example 1.
We now  produce an example  illustrating  the equilibrium  choice  of j.  The example  is
identical  to that of section  II.A-1,  and in addition  we set J = 3.  Thus R, (z) = RI, R2 (z) = R2z,
and R3(z) =  R3z2, with zE[O,l).
For this example,  j(z) = 1 iffRI 2 R2z and RI 2 R 3Z 2 hold. Thus  j(z) = 1 iff
(34)  z S min[RI/R 2, (RI/R 3)0  5].
Similarly,  j(z) = 2 ifflR 2z 2 RI and R2z 2 R 3Z 2 are both satisfied.  In particular,  then,  j(z) = 2 iff
(35)  RI/R 2 S z s (R2/R3)°  5.
j(z) = 3 holds if (34) and (35) are violated.
Evidently, for this example  j(z) = I for "small enough" z, while j(z) = J = 3 for "large
enough"  z. j(z) = 2 holds for some  z iffRI/R 2 s (R 2/R3) 0.5holds.
242.  Example 2.
This example  explores  the configuration  of the relationship  between  transactions  costs and
the steady  state per capita  capital  stock  in some  detail  for the case  J = 2.  Since  here R,  = RI, we
can summarize  transactions  costs entirely  by the magnitude  of R.
Technology  I maximizes  the internal  rate of return on capital  investments  iff
(36)  aR, 2 (aR2)°
holds. Equation  (36), of course, is equivalent  to
(36')  K2  s  .
For values of R2 satisfying  (36') as a strict inequality,  j* = 1, and k = (b/a)H 1(aRI). Here
k is independent  of R2.  and hence independent  of the costs of transacting  in equity  markets.
When R2 = aR,  j,  X ( 1,2), and either  technology  can be in use. Moreover,  lemnma  1
establishes  that Hj(aRI)  > H2(aRI)  = H2[(a  R2 )0s] holds.  Thus k lies in the interval  [H2(aR 1),
HI(aRI)]. And finally,  when  (36') is violated  (that is, when R2 is large  enough,  or transactions
costs are low enough),  j  = 2.  Then k = (b/a) H2[(aR2 )O.5]  holds. Since H2 > 0 the steady state
capital  stock increases  with increases  in R2 (reductions  in transactions  costs) beyond  this point.
Of course, H,(aR,) =  aR, and H2[(aR 2)0 ]5  =  aR2/[1 +  (aR2 k)5]  both hold [see equation
(24)]. Then H2[(a  R2)0V53>2  H,(aR,) holds iff
(37)  (R2 )0.5 2 [R 1(a) 05 + (aR2 + 4R 1)05]/2  > R 1(a) 05.
For values  of (R2 )0  5 between  R1(a) 0 5and the right-hand  side of (37), H2[(aR2 )0.5]  lies below
25aRl = HI(aRi). In this range, moderate  levels  of transactions  costs induce  the use of technology
2. However,  more capital  would  be produced  if technology  I were utilized  instead. Figure 3
summarizes  the relationship  between  k and R2
C.  Steady State Welfare
We now describe  the effects  of reductions  in transactions  costs for steady state welfare.
To do so, recall  that all young  agents earn  the real wage income  b, and save all of this income for
old period consumption  at the gross rate of return  y(z). Thus steady state welfare  is simply  y(z)b.
Therefore,  by proposition  l.b, a reduction  in transactions  costs cannot  reduce steady state
welfare,  and a reduction  in transactions  costs must actually  raise steady state welfare  ifj  > 1.
The simplicity  of this result  depends  heavily,  however,  on the fact that the real wage rate
here is independent  of the capital  stock, so that all welfare  effects  occur through changes  in the
rate of return on savings. If the real wage did depend  on k, then reductions  in transactions  costs
that reduce k would  also reduce w. The effect  of transactions  cost reductions  would  then depend
on the relative  magnitudes  of the changes  in y(z) and k(z). If z' > z and k(z') < k(z) hold,  and if
the real wage is a function  of the capital-labor  ratio, then it can easily  occur that transactions  cost
reductions  do reduce  steady state welfare. Examples  illustrating  this possibility  appear  in
Bencivenga,  Smith,  and Starr (1994 a,c).
IV.  Transactions Costs as Pure Rents
In this section  we analyze  the same  set of issues  as before under the assumption  that
transactions  costs represent  pure fees (and rents) paid  to a broker or market maker. Thus, while
26representing costs to equity market participants, these fees associated with transactions no longer
represent a social resource loss. For simplicity  we assume that the fees collected by
brokers/market makers are simply rebated to old agents as a lump-sum; we can think of this as
corresponding to a situation where all young agents are given equal shares in a brokerage firm. In
addition, to enforce the notion that there are no social resource losses associated with the
transactions process, we assume that none of the time of a broker/market maker is diverted from
labor supply when young.  An alternative interpretation of the model of this section, of course, is
simply that the government taxes or subsidizes equity market transactions, and rebates the
proceeds to old agents as a lump-sum.2' Many developing country governments do act to
subsidize the formation of equity markets [Fry (1988)];  the formulation of this section allows us
to analyze the consequences of this activity.
To further simplify  matters, we assume that23
(38)  o?a0=c0=0;j=  1, ...,J  o'=  a<  1;  Vj,Vh=  1, ... ,j-1.
Thus there are no fees associated with the initiation of new capital investments, or with
transactions in factor markets.  On all transactions transferring the ownership of CIP (equity),
however, equity market participants face a fee that is proportional to the real value of their
trausactions.
A.  Steady  State Equilibrium  Conditions
The same reasoning  as in section  II establishes  that the equilibrium  choice  of capital
production  technology,  j*, is that which  maximizes  the internal  rate of return on capital
investments,  net of the transactions  costs perceived  by an owner  of CIP. Thus
27j* = arg max [(aR;)15]
holds,  where R, continues  to be given  by (11). It is also the case that the steady state equilibrium
rate of return perceived  by young  agents  is simply  the internal  rate of return on technology  j¶, net
of the transactions  costs they face. Thus
y =  (aRj.)',
as before. In addition  the aggregate  portfolio  weights  CA are defined  as previously,  and equation
(16) continues  to hold.
The equilibrium  conditions  that do require  modification  are those describing  capital
formation  and market  clearing  in CIP. In the former  case  transactions  costs here no longer
consume  CIP, and hence R1. is no longer  relevant  to the amount  of capital  received  per unit
invested  j* periods  earlier. Rather all capital  investment  ultimately  translates  into usable  physical
capital,  and
(39)  k = Rj.  w  b.
Equation  (39) replaces  equation  (22). Similarly,  no CIP is ever used in the transactions  process,
and hence  the supply  of type (j*,h)  CIP in a steady  state equilibrium  is simply  w& °/P'°  = b9  °,
while  the demand  for type (j*,h) CIP is bG Wbp  '.  Thus market  clearing  in type (j*,h) CEP
requires
(40)  b8fPJ'O  = bO' ; h = O,  j  1
Equation (40) replaces  equation  (17).
In order characterize  a steady state equilibrium,  we note that (18) continues  to hold.
Moreover,  from (38),
28b-l nj  a1  - z  =  (I  -a)b; h  1  ,j*-
I=0
It follows  that
(41)  [y/(I - a)]'; h = O,  j* - I
Substituting  (41) into (40) and rearranging  terms  gives
(42)  Oi*-  = O"'°  [y/(l - a)]'; h = O,,  j*-1
Therefore,  from (16) and (42),
(43)  h = O  [y/(l  - a)]i  =  Oi*°11  (-  [.y/(l  - I  ){  1-  [y/(l  - a)]}  =  1
boo  bsO
must be satisfied. Thus
(44)  VA'°  =(  - [y/(1  - a)])/(1  - [y/(l  - a)?").
As before,  transactions  cost and technological  parameters  entirely  determine  the equilibrium
choice  of capital  production  technology,  the rate of return on savings,  and the composition  of
savings  across  different  vintages  of type  j* CIP.
In order to determine  the steady state equilibrium  value of the per capita capital  stock,
substitute  equation  (44) into equation  (29) to get
(45)  k = bNj (I1  - [y/(l - ax)])J{  I - [y/(l - a)y)}
However,  since  y = (aRk.)' 0 = [aRj.(1  - ay)-']'I,  y/(I - a) = [aRk.  /(I - a)]'r  holds.
Therefore,  equation  (45) reduces  to
(46)  k = bRN.  {  1  - [aRI./(1  - a)'d }/{1 - [aRj./(I - a)]).
Thus
29j*=  argmax[(aR  )'§]=  argmax[aRj(1  -a'xl]lr
and equation  (46) give  the steady  state equilibrium  level  of the per capita capital  stock as a
function  of the transactions  fee a.
We now  wish to analyze  how the steady state equilibrium  value of k varies with a.  In
order  to simplify  the exposition,  we focus our attention  on the case J = 2.
B.  An Example: J = 2.
When  there are only  two technologies  for producing  capital,  j* = I holds iff
(47)  aR, 2 (aR2)1 2.
Since R2 = R2 (1 - a), equation  (47) is equivalent  to
(x48)  a21-(aR2~~2/R2).
If a satisfies  (48) as a strict inequality,  j* = 1, while  if a satisfies  (48) at equality,  j* e { 1,2).
Violation  of equation  (48) implies  that j* = 2.
When  j* =1, equation  (46) implies  that k = bR,.  Alternatively,  when  j* = 2, equation  (46)
implies  that
k = bR 2 {  I - [aR 2/(I - a)] 0 5 })/{1  - [aR2/(l  - a)])  =  bR2/{  + [aR2/(l - a)]0-5.
Thus the steady state equilibrium  capital  stock per capita, as a function  of a, is given by
k=bR  ;  a>  1  -(aR'/R 2 )
(49)  k  E [bR,/[(R1/R 2) + 1], bRI]; a = I - (aR'/R2)
k=bRJ{I  +[aR2/(1 -a)] 0');a<  I -(aR2/R2)
Equation  (49) is depicted in figure  4.
30As shown  in figure  4, for high  values  of a (high  transactions  costs), the necessity  of
transferring  the ownership  of CIP makes  technology  2 prohibitively  expensive  to use. Hence
technology  I is the equilibrium  choice  of capital  production  technology,  equity  markets  are
inactive,  and the value  of a is irrelevant  to the capital  stock. However,  once a is low enough
land specifically,  no greater  than I - (aR'  IR 2)], transactions  costs are sufficiently  small  to allow
technology  2 to be competitive.  Once  this occurs,  further  reductions  in transactions  costs raise
the internal  rate of return on technology  2, and result in a higher  level  of the steady state per
capita capital  stock. In contrast  to what happens  in section  III, however,  this does not transpire
because  technology  2 becomes  more productive. (Recall  that R 2 is fixed.) Rather the capital
stock increases  because  reductions  in transactions  costs raise  08O,  and thus alter the composition
of savings  in a way  that is  favorable to capital  formation.  Thus again  the consequences  of
changes  in transactions  costs for the composition  of savings  are an essential  part of the story.
Of course 0810  = 1, while  02-0 < I holds. The consequence  of this observation  is that as a
transits  from being  just below I - (a R2  /R 2 ) to being  just above I - (a R' 1R 2), an increased
fraction  of savings  is used to initiate  new capital  investment.  For this reason,  local reductions  in
transactions  costs that cause  j* to increase  also necessarily  cause  the capital  stock  to decline.
Indeed,  it is easy to show  that the steady  state equilibrium  capital  stock with  j* =  2 is no less than
that with j*I  iff
(50)  a S 1 - (aR' /R 2) [R2/(R2- R1)]2 < 1 - (aR  2 R2).
Equation (50) describes  how low  a must be in order  for the use of technology  2 not to be
associated  with a reduction  in the steady  state equilibrium  capital  stock.
31C.  Steady State Welfare  (J = 2)
We now examine  how steady  state welfare  varies  with a.  The answer  to this question
involves  the consideration  of two factors. First, since  the real wage rate is  just b and since  all
young  period income  is saved,  one component  of old period consumption  is simply  yb.
Moreover,  since
y = max (aR,,[aRz(1  - a)]0-5),
clearly  the choice  of a transactions  fee can affect  y. Second,  the choice  of a can affect  the lump-
sum transfer  received  by old agents. Recall  that the real  value of financial  transactions  per capita
is given by b(l  - 6  *).  In addition, all agents pay a fee of a  per transaction, with transactions
measured  in real terns.  Thus the transfer  received  by an old agent in real terms is given  by
ab(I  - 3),  and steady state welfare is given by
U = bmax (aRi, [aR 2(1 - a)]0-') + ab(I  - Gt°).
Ifj* = 1 [that is, if a  > I - (aR 2 /R 2)], then 9 °= 0 =90  = 1, and steady state utility is just
U, = baR,.  On the other hand, ifj* = 2, then
y  o =  2 8 0 = (1 -[y/(l - a)])/(1  - [y/(l  -Ca)] 2 )  =
1 + [y/(l  - a)]} 1 =  I1(1  + [aR2/(I  - a)]0-
As a result, steady state welfare  is given  by
(51)  U2(a) a b[aR 2(1 - a)] 0 5 + ab  [1 - 1/{  1 + [aR2/(l - a)]0 5)] = b[aR 2(1 - a)]° ' +
abl[aR2 (l - a)]0-5/I{ + [aRJ(l  - a)]0-5) =b[aR2(1 - a)]°'  (  1 +
al(1 - a)  (1 + [aR2/(1 - a)] 0 )) =b[aR 2(1 - a)]05  {  1 + [aR 2(1 - a)5")/(  1 -
a + [aR2(1  - a)]0 ') = b(aR2)5 (1 + [aR 2(1 - a)]°5)}{(1  - a)03 + (aR2g  ).
32It is straightforward  but tedious  to show  that U2  (a)  2 (s)0 iff aR 2 < (2) 1. Thus if aR 2 <  I holds,
steady  state welfare  is increasing  in the transactions  fee for all a < I - (aRt /R2).  Once a > 1 -
(aR2  /R2), steady state welfare  is constant  at Ul. If aR2> 1, then steady  state welfare  is declining
in a for all a < 1 - (a R2  /R2).  We now consider  each case separately.
1. Case 1:  aR 2 < 1.
In this case,  U2(ax)  is maximized  by setting  a = 1 - (aR2 /R2);  the largest  value of a
consistent  with  j  =2.  Evaluating  (51) at this value of a  yields
(52)  U2[1 - (aR2/R2)] = b(I + aRI)/[1 + (R,/R 2)].
Then  U2[1  - (aR2?/R 2)] 2 U 1 = baRI holds  iff
(53)  1 2aR,R 2,
or that is, iff the value  of a that maximizes  steady  state welfare  with  j  = 2 is positive. Thus, to
summarize,  if aR 2 < I and (53) hold,  the welfare  maximizing  value of a is I - (aR?1R 2)  R  0.  If
on the other hand,  aR 2 < I holds  and (53) fails,  U2(a) < U, for all a.  Then welfare  maximization
dictates  setting  a > 1  - (a R' /R2). In either  case, it is undesirable  to make efforts  to reduce
transactions  costs below I - (aR2/R 2), and it is certainly  undesirable  to subsidize  equity  market
transactions.
Of course if aR 2 < 1 holds,  then the internal  rate of return on technology  2 - gross of
transactions  costs  - is less than  the steady state growth rate of the economy. Here capital
investments  in technology  2 are socially  unproductive. If (53) holds as a strict inequality  as well,
then  this same  statement  is aiso true of investments  in technology  1. As a consequence,  steady
33state welfare  is maximized  by setting  the transactions  fee in a way that minimizes the steady state
equilibrium  capital  stock.
2.  Case2:  aR2>1.
In this case  U2(a) is decreasing  in a, and is therefore  maximized  by setting  a arbitrarily
small. From (51),
lim U2(a) = baR 2.
Thus if aR2> I and R2 > RI both hold,  it is optimal  to maximally  subsidize  equity  market
transactions.  If aR2 > 1 and R 2 < R  hold,  then it is welfare  maximizing  to set a > I - (a R  2/R 2),
and to havej* =  1. When  aR2> I holds,  the intemal  rate of return on investments  in technology  2
(gross of transactions  costs) exceeds  the rate of growth of the economy,  so that such investments
are socially  productive. When  R2 > RI also holds,  technology  2 should  be utilized,  and steady
state welfare  maximization  involves  maximizing  the steady state equilibrium  capital  stock.
3. Summary.
As the examples  just given  indicate,  it can either  be desirable  to subsidize,  or to heavily
charge agents  transacting  in equity  markets. It will  be optimal  to confront  agents undertaking
such  transactions  with relatively  heavy  fees when aR 2 < 1 or, in other words, when the internal
rate of return on technology  2 (at a zero transactions  cost level)  is less than the real growth rate
of the economy. It will also be optimal  to impose  high fees in these markets  when aR2> 1 and
RI> R 2 both hold. Thus, even  if the internal  rate of return on technology  2 exceeds  the rate of
growth (at a level of zero transactions  costs), it is undesirable  to use technology  2 if it is less
34productive  than  technology  1. However,  when  aR2> I (the internal  rate of return on technology
2 exceeds  the growth rate) and R2> RI (technology  2 is more productive  than  technology  1),
there is good reason  to subsidize  equity  market  activity. However,  as should  be apparent  from
this  discussion,  an evaluation  of the desirability  of subsidizing  equity  market activity  -- even  in this
simple  example  - requires  a good deal of knowledge  about  the internal  rates of return on
investments  available  to an economy.
These  observations  do suggest  a criterion  for determining  when it is desirable  to tax (or
raise  the costs faced  by) equity  market  participants.  A socially  excessive  volume  of financial
market  transactions  is undertaken  in economies  with relatively  high levels  of equity  market
activity  G*  = 2, so that 02°  < 1), and  with real interest  rates (gross of transactions  costs) less  than
the long-run  real rate of growth of the economy  (aR 2 <  1). In this situation,  it is desirable  to take
actions  to reduce  the attractiveness  of participating  in equity  markets.
V.  Some Final Thoughts
We have  posed for ourselves  the following  question: how does the efficiency  of an
economy's  capital  resale,  or equity  markets  - as measured  by the costs of transacting  in them  -
affect  its efficiency  in producing  physical  capital  and, through  this channel,  final  goods and
services? In order to propose an answer  to this question,  we have followed  Hicks (1969)  in
emphasizing  the role of equity  markets  in providing  liquidity  to holders  of long-lived  and
inherently  illiquid  capital. As the efficiency  of an economy's  capital  markets  increases  (that is, as
transactions  costs fall),  the general  effect  is to cause  agents to make longer term, and hence more
transactions  intensive  investments.  The result is a higher  rate of return on savings,  as well  as a
35change  in its composition.  These  general equilibrium  effects  on the composition  of savings  cause
agents  to hold  more of their wealth  in the form of existing  equity  claims,  and to invest less  in the
initiation  of new capital  investments.  As a result, a reduction  in the resouce  losses suffered  in the
transactions  process  can cause  the capital  stock either  to rise or to fall,  and we have described
conditions  under  which  each situation  will  obtain. However,  a general  point that bears  emphasis
is that a reduction  in transactions  costs will  typically  alter the composition  of savings  and
investment,  and that any  analysis  of the consequences  of such changes  must take these effects  into
account.
As a practical  matter,  we would  expect the costs of transacting  in secondary  capital
markets  to be reflected  in the term structure  of asset yields  observed  in an economy. The yield  to
maturity  (gross of transactions  costs) on investments  in assets of type  j* is given  by
r(Pij)Jj  i  ry/[  n
E)Lh=O
Similarly,  the yield  to maturity  on assets of typej (jOj*) 2 4 is given  by 5j-  M(PW)'d  If agents can
engage in short sales  - incurring  normal  transactions  costs as they do so - then it is easy to show
that 6j (j￿j*)  satisifies
j-  I  ~~~~~~~i-I
y/[  nl (I  1-c  )]  2  2.  y[  rI (i1~)
Then term premia  (or yield  spreads  between maturies),  which  are simply  given by 5j - 81,  reflect
the relative  costs of transacting  in different  assets. As transactions  costs increase  we would
typically  expect  term premia  to increase  as well,  so that the efficiency  of an economy's financial
system  would  generally  be reflected  in the slope  of its yield  curve. Improvements  in the
36functioning  of financial  markets  should  be expected  to flatten  the term structure  of returns,25  and
to have  the other consequences  we have  noted.
It is also the case  that governments  and central  banks often contemplate  interventions
designed  to affect  the slope  of the term structure. The consequences  of such interventions  -- or at
least of ones  that work by affecting  the transactions  costs agents perceive  -- can be analyzed  via
the methods  discussed  in section  IV. As suggested  there, one possible  outcome is that the
reduction  of unnecessary  transactions  costs flattens  the term structure,  and allows  socially  more
productive  investments  to be undertaken.
37Footnotes
1.  For documentation  of this claim  in historical  or modern  development  contexts,  see
Cameron  (1967)  and McKinnon  (1973)  and Shaw (1973),  respectively.  For quantitative
analyses  of the experiences  of a variety  of economies,  see Goldsmith  (1969), Antje  and
Jovanovic  (1992), or King  and Levine  (1993a,  b).
2.  For a discussion  of various  examples,  see Galbis  (1979),  van Wijnbergen  (1983, 1985),
Diaz-Alejandro  (1985),  Khatkhate  (1988),  or Fry (1988).
3.  The financial  revolution  is a term  applied  by Dickson  (1967)  to the rapid  development  of
English  financial  markets  in the first half  of the eighteenth  century.
4.  Many  details  of this model  are generalized  in Bencivenga,  Smith,  and Starr (1994a,b,c).
5.  This result  would  need  to be qualified  in more  general  models,  like  those of Bencivenga,
Smith  and Starr (1994a,c).
6.  Note that we are abstracting  both from heterogeneity,  and population  growth. Both are
inessential  simplifications  that reduce  notational  requirements.
7.  We thus abstract  from any interesting  labor supply  or savings  decisions  on the part of
households.
8.  The use of a linear  technology  confronts  the firm  with an essentially  trivial decision
regarding  the choice  of factor inputs.
9.  The assumption  that all capital,  however  produced,  is perfectly  substitutable  in production
is relaxed  by Bencivenga,  Smith,  and Starr (1994c).
10.  Our assumptions  on capital  production  technologies  imply  that capital  investments  are
completely  unproductive  until they  mature. This can be thought  of as an "Austrian"  model
of investment. It is possible  to alter the analysis  to allow  all capital  investments  to mature
in one period,  but to have  capital  produced  via different  technologies  having  different
productive  lifetimes.  This, however,  is a more complicated  model,  and we do not pursue
it here.
11.  Under this specification,  transactions  costs represent  a pure resource  loss. We consider
below the alternative  case  in which  transactions  costs represent  a pure transfer  to market
makers  (or a tax paid  to the government).
12.  For example,  as close to Diamond  (1965)  as possible. See also Azariadis  (1992), chapter
13, or Galor and Ryder  (1989).
3813.  Since  there are no transactions  costs in factor markets,  this amounts to assuming  that
cii = O,  v  j = 1,.,J.
14.  That is, the price  of mature CIP is simply  the rental  value of the associated  capital.
15.  We consider  the possibility  of multiple  equilibrium  capital  production  technologies  in
section  III.B.
16.  If all households  were behaving  identically,  8s  = Ps" Si"/w  would  hold.
17.  Notice  that C 'h w gives  the value,  in real  terms, of the demand  for type (j*,h) CIP.
Division  by  piSh  converts  this demand  into units of CIP.
18.  The notion that transactions  costs are larger for long maturity  assets is certainly  consistent
with casual  observation.  For instance,  the Wall  Street Journal of July  23, 1993, reported
a bid/ask  spread  on three month treasury  bills  of the previous  day equal to 0.005 percent
of price. For a thirty year  treasury  bond, this spread  was 0.062 percent of price, while  for
a thirty  year  treasury  strip (a pure discount  instrument,  equivalent  to a long-term  bill)  the
spread  was 0.7 percent  of price. Thus transactions  costs vary by a factor of 100  with
maturity  alone,  despite  the fact that these observations  ignore  the obvious  likelihood  that a
long-term  instrument  will  be rolled-over  many  more  times during  its lifetime  than a short-
term instrument.
19.  H(z) is a function  iffj(z) is unique. We discuss  below  what happens  when two or more
technologies  maximize  the internal  rate of return on investments.
20.  See Bencivenga,  Smith,  and Starr (1  994a) for a formal  proof of this assertion.
21.  When  j(z) is not unique,  G(z) consists  of a vertical  segment  for the same  reasons as
before. In particular,  if technologies  I and n > I both maximize  the internal  rate of return
on capital  invesments,  then  agents can invest  exclusively  in technology  £, exclusively  in
technology  n, or in convex  combinations  of the two technologies. As a result, the fraction
of wealth held  in the from of equity  can lie anywhere  in the interval  [G ([a R (Z)]R.),
G{([AR(z)]})].
22.  The assumption  that resources  collected  in the form of fees or taxes are rebated to old
agents prevents  a transfer  of the proceeds from  those who bear  these costs (by assumption
sellers,  or old agents)  to those  who do not (by assumption  buyers,  or young agents). A
transfer  of resources  from old to young  agents would,  under our assumptions,  raise the
aggregate  savings  rate and, in and of itself,  constitute  a stimulus  to capital  formation. We,
on the other hand,  wish to isolate  the effects  of transactions  costs alone. Therefore  we
rebate the proceeds  of fee or tax collections  to those who pay the fees or taxes. Given  our
preference  assumptions,  the result is that savings  pattems are unaltered  by the existence  of
fees/taxes.
3923.  We do not restrict  a to be non-negative  since,  under  the interpretation  of a  as  a
tax/subsidy,  negative  values of a correspond  to the subsidization  of equity  market activity.
24.  Of course  these  assets are held  in zero net quantity  in equilibrium.
25.  For more detail  on the term structure  of asset yields  in a model  of this type, along  with a
precise  statement  of the claim  just made,  see Bencivenga,  Smith,  and Starr (1994c).
40Appendix
A.  Proof of Lemma 1.
Parts (a) - (c) follow  immediately  from the definition  of Hj. Part (d) follows  from using
L'Hospital's  rule to evaluate  Hj(l).  For part (e), straightforward  differentiation  yields
(A.  1)  H ' (x) = xi~ j-'  (  + I)x + )d+1]1(1  _ xj)2.
It is straightforward  to show  that, V  x # 1,  j - (j + 1)  x +  xd+'  >  0  holds. Thus H; (x) > 0, V x > 0
and x # 1. An application  of L'Hospital's  rule yields H (1) > 0.
To establish  part (f), note that Hj+i(x)  S Hj(x)  is equivalent  to
(A.2)  (I - x)id+ll(l  - xi+)  s (I - x)xj/(l  - Xi).
Since (1 - x)/(l  - xi+') > 0 and (1 - x)/(l - xd)  > 0 both hold, (A.2) is equivalent to
[xI  (1 - x') -x'(1  -xe  )]/(I  - x)  = -x'  ￿0,
which  is obviously  satisfied.  0
B.  Proof of Lemma 2.
Part (a) is easily  established  directly  using  the definition  of Gj. For part (c),
straightforward  differentiation  yields
(A.3)  G; (x) =  [I -ijx'  + G  - 1)x']/(1  - xJ)2.
For x w 1, it can be shown  that I - jx"  + (. - _)xi  > 0 holds;  hence G; (x) > 0 V x > 0, x ￿1.
For x =  1, repeated  application  of L'Hospital's rule yields G; (1) > 0.
For part (b), note  that Gj+.(x)  2 Gj(x)  is equivalent  to
(A.4)  x(1 - x'')/(I - i)  S x(1 - x')/(l - i+|).
41Since  (1 - x')(l - x*) > 0 holds,  (A.4) is equivalent  to the condition.
(AW4)  I - i~+'  - xtl' + x'j s  I - 2)H  + x'j.
(A.4'), in turn, reduces  to
(A.4"1)  x  - 1)2 2 0,
which  obviously  holds.  0
C.  Proof of Proposition 1.
(a) Suppose  to the contrary  that z' > z holds,  but that  j(z) >j(z'). Letj -j(z)  and
j' - j(z').  Then,  by the definition  ofj(z),
(A-5)  [a R, (z)]"  [a  Rj (z)]4 
Moreover,
(A.6)  d/dz [aRj(z)]'0 [aRj(z)]'I  [C;(z)/jR,(z)]  > d/dz [aRj (z)]1§  =
[a  i.  (z)]l  [R,r(ZR/,iE (z)].
for all z, where  the inequality  follows  from (A.5) and equation  (29). But (A.5) and (A.6) imply
that
(A-7)  [a R, (:e)]rlq  > la Fj, (z')]'-
However,  (A.7) contradicts  the definition  ofj(z),  establishing  the result.  U
(b) Suppose  that  j(z) - j(z').  Then y(z').  [a.E),(z')]J  2 [aK)(z)]u  ' (z), since
R'3) 2 0. Moreover,  if j(z) > 1, Rk,  > 0 holds,  as does y(z') > y(z).
Ifj(z') > j(z), on the other hand,  then
42y(z') - [a  R i(z) (z)]*A  > [akR.()  (z')]'r'()  2!  [a  Rj(.)  (z)]'"(?I,
where  the first inequality  follows  from the definition  ofj(z), and the second from R'  Žt  0. This j(z)
establishes  the claim. 0
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45Figure 1:  Capital  Accumulation  and Transactions  Costs
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rses;  fist  to 1,  then  to n  >  1, and  ultimately  to J. (b/a)H(z)  gives  the steady  state  capital  stock  at
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As in figure 1, at low values  of z, j(z) = 1. As z increases  the equilibrium  maturity  of capital
investments  will also increase;  first to t, then to n > 1,  and ultimately  to J. G(z) gives  the fraction
of wealth  held  in the form of CIP (or equity  claims)  at each value of z.Figur 3: Example  2
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